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Folk: Administrative Law

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ERNEST L. FOLK, III*
During the Survey period, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina decided two cases of maximum importance on questions of standing, first to invoke administrative action, and
secondly to secure judicial review of administrative action.
Because of their great significance, these two decisions,
Black River Elec. Coop. v. Public Serv. Comm'n.,' and Camp v.
Board of Public Works, 2 respectively, will be fully analyzed
in this article, which concludes with a short discussion of
several rulings of lesser significance on administrative law
question.
WHO MAY SEEK ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION:
OF STANDING

THE TEST

A basic administrative law issue has to do with the test
of standing of a person to invoke administrative action. A
closely related problem is the test of standing to secure
judicial review of administrative action. Although there
are some distinctions to be drawn between these two questions,8 there is much common ground in considering these
issues. "In Black River Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n.,4 the Court dealt with the first of these in construing two statutory provisions declaring what classes" of
affected persons may file a complaint with the Commission.
This important decision purports to lay down a generally
applicable interpretation of the criterion of standing, and
for this reason its implications will be considered from
both angles - standing before an agency, and standing in
court.
Black River Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("Black River"), a
non-profit membership corporation created under the Rural
Electric Cooperative Act, 5 chiefly operates within the Sumter
*Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 238 S. C. 282, 120 S. E. 2d 6 (1961).
2. 238 S. C. 461, 120 S. E. 2d 681 (1961).
3. Ordinarily, standing is much more liberally accorded when the
petitioner seeks only to institute or otherwise participate (as intervenors,
protestants, etc.) in an administrative proceeding than when he seeks
judicial review of already completed administrative action.
4. 238 S. C. 282, 120 S. E. 2d 6 (1961).
5. CODE oF LAws o SOUTH CAROLINA, §§ 12-1001 - 1083 (1952).
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area. Carolina Power and Light Company ("CPL") is a
regulated electric utility also generally serving the Sumter
area. At the request of certain corporations and individuals
undertaking an extensive residential development near Sumter, CPL agreed to furnish electric utility service, although
Black River was also able and willing to do so and in fact
had asked to do so. On refusal, Black River petitioned the
Public Service Commission ("Commission") charging that
CPL was invading Black River's service area, and requesting
the Commission to order CPL to cease and desist from
furnishing the proposed service, and to deny CPL a certificate
of public convenience and necessity on the ground that such
a certificate, if granted, would "greatly interfere with [Black
River's] service or system."0 After full hearing, the Commission ruled on the merits (1) that CPL's pre-existing
operations in the contested area made it unnecessary for it
to secure a certificate, and7 (2) that, in any event, Black
River could not secure exclusive service rights which would
preclude service by a regulated utility." Black River's petition9 had predicated standing on S. C. Code § 24-6710 ("any
interested person, corporation, or municipality" may attack
a utility's non-certificated service) and § 24-6811 (an "electrical utility claiming to be injuriously affected" by another
utility's action may seek a Commission order). The Commission was "inclined to the view" that a cooperative was
not an "electrical utility" for § 24-68 purposes, "but may be
an 'interested person' within the purview of Section 24-67,"
6. Record p. 8, Black River Elec. Coop. v. Public Serv. Comm'n.,
238 S. C. 282, 120 S. E. 2d 6 (1961), hereinafter cited as "Record."
'7. Record pp. 316-319, esp. at 319.

8. Record pp. 319-321.
9. Record p. 8.
10. "Whenever an electrical utility, except a municipality within its

corporate limits, is engaged or is about to engage in construction or operation without having secured a certificate of public convenience and neces-

sity as required by the provisions of this chapter, any interested person,

corporation or municipality may file a complaint with the Commission.
The Commission may, with or without notice, make its order requiring the

electrical utility complained of to cease and desist from such construction
or operation until the Commission makes and files its decision on such
complaint or until the further order of the Commission."
11. "If any electrical utility in constructing or extending its lines, plant
or system unreasonably interferes or is about to interfere unreasonably

with the service or system of any other electrical utility, the Commission
on complaint of the electrical utility claiming to be injuriously affected
may after hearing make such order and prescribe such terms and conditions
in harmony with this chapter as are just and reasonable."
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although it did not pass on this "legal question" because of
its decision on the merits.' 2
Black River attacked the Commission's decision in the
circuit court which sustained the Commission's action on the
merits, holding that the evidence was sufficient 3 and also
that Black River had no exclusive service rights' 4 On the
standing issue, it concluded that a cooperative may be an
"electrical utility" for § 24-68 purposes,' 5 but did not advert
to the "interested person" test of § 24-67.
The Supreme Court agreed that a cooperative has no
exclusive service rights or area.' 0 The main thrust of the
opinion, however, was that Black River had no standing to
institute the proceeding before the Commission, since it was
neither an "electrical utility" under § 24-67, nor an "interested person" under § 24-67. "[A]n 'interested' person
or corporation is one who has a legal right which will be injuriously affected by the proposed" action of CPL, and
"[h]aving no exclusive franchise to serve the area in controversy, no legal right of [Black River] will be invaded by
[CPL's] competition. Any injury from such competition is
damnum absque injuria."'1 7 The Court, however, observed
that a cooperative may be "heard before the Commission
when application is made by a regulated public utility for
a certificate of public convenience and necessity" since "the
Commission may and should acquaint itself with all facts
necessary to enable it to make a proper decision" and thus
should hear anyone "who may be in a position to give information pertinent" to that question.' 8
In Ti-County Elec. Coop. v. Snow,' 9 decided the same
day, similar issues under the same statutes were disposed
of per curirm on the authority of Black River. In TriCounty, a non-profit electric cooperative petitioned the Commission to order the City of Orangeburg to cease and desist
12. Record pp. 317-318.
13. Record pp. 370-373.
14. Record pp. 373-374.
15. Record pp. 369-370.
16. 238 S. C. at 290-293, 120 S. E. 2d at 10-11. The Court also stressed
the fact that electric coops are not subject to the Commission's normal
regulatory jurisdiction, e. g., no certificate of public convenience and necessity is required.
17. Id. at 295, 120 S. E. 2d at 12.
18. Id. at 297-298, 120 S. E. 2d at 13-14.
19. 238 S. C. 298, 120 S. E. 2d 14 (1961).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1963

3

1962]

LAW
CAROLINA
OF SOUTH
SURVEY
South Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 15,
Iss. 1 [1963], Art. 3

from extending municipal electric utility operations outside
the city limits which Tri-County claimed to include its service
area.20 The city's motion to dismiss specifically denied that
Tri-County was either an "electrical utility" or an "interested
person." 21 In the Commission's oral opinion dismissing the
action, it seemingly assumed that the only standing issue was
Tri-County's claimed status as an "electrical utility," and
on this point the Commission ruled that it was not.22 Although the "interested person" point was preserved in TriCounty's complaint in the circuit court,23 that court dealt
only with the "electrical utility" issue,2 4 and, like the Commission, ruled adversely to Tri-County, although the court also
upheld the Commission on the merits. 25 In the Supreme
26
Court, the "interested person" issue was scarcely mentioned,
and the Supreme Court, without distinguishing the two asserted bases for standing, held solely on the basis of Black
River, that Tri-County was without standing, and that its
complaint to the Commission had been properly dismissed.
A. Standing as an "electrical utility."
As noted earlier, S.C. Code § 24-68 provides, in substance,
that if any "electrical utility" takes action which, either
actually or potentially, "unreasonably interferes . . . with
the service or system of any other electrical utility," the
Commission may grant relief "on complaint of the electrical
utility claiming to be injuriously affected." The issue here
is, of course, one of standing, but the actual question is essentially the construction of a term of art in the public utility
statutes, that is whether, given the peculiar and special
character of electric coops, they are "electrical utilities."
Assuming the correctness of the Court's resolution of this
27
issue - on which decisions from other states seem to agree
20. Record p. 2, Tri-County Elec. Coop. v. Snow, 238 S. C. 298, 120
S. E. 2d 14 (1961), hereinafter cited as "Record (Tri-County)." The major
thrust of the complaint allegations was injury to the coop's service area a position more consistent with being a § 24-68 "electrical utility" than a
§ 24-67 "interested person."
21. Record (Tri-County) p. 7.
22. Record (Tri-County) p. 7.
23. Record (Tri-County) p. 16.
24. Record (Tri-County) pp. 23-32.
25. Record (Tri-County) pp. 32-36.
26. An exception noted that the lower court had ruled "in effect" that
the coop was not an "interested person." Record (Tri-County) p. 39.
27. Several of the decisions cited and relied upon in Black River seem
clearly to sustain the proposition that an electrical coop is not an "electrical utility" within the meaning of statutes comparable to CODE OF LAWS OF
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- there can be no question that a coop is without standing
under § 24-68, which concerns disputes between regulated
utilities. Hence, in Tri-County, a holding of no standing under
§ 24-68 fully disposes of the case, since apparently the entire
proceeding, from complaint through both stages of judicial
review, proceeded under § 24-68, on the assumption that
Tri-County was an "electrical utility." This, however, is not
adequate to dispose of the standing issue in Black River,
since there the issues were also framed on the theory that
Black River was an "interested person" within the meaning
of § 24-67, and the Supreme Court decided it was not an
"interested person."
B. Standing as an "InterestedPerson."
The really significant administrative law issue is Black
River's square holding that an "interested person" under
§ 24-67 must have some "legal right" before he can invoke
the protection of the Commission and, presumably, of the
courts on review.
1. In equating an "interested person" with the holder of
a "legal right," the Court has, first of all, adopted a test
which, by itself, is unilluminating. Indeed, it is circular to
assert that one has standing-only if he has a "legal :right."
For one has a "legal right" if he has some interest which the
court (or an agency) will recognize and p'robect on his petition. And thus if one has a "legal right," he iiecessarily has
§ 24-68 (1952). San Miguel Power Ass'n v. Public Serv.
Comm'n., 4 Utah 2d 252, 292 P. 2d 511 (1956) ; Socorro Elec. Coop., Inc.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 66 N. M. 343, 348 P. 2d 88 (1959); Clearwater
Power Co. v. Washington Water Pwr. Co., 78 Idaho 150, 299 P. 2d 484
(1956). It should be stressed that all three of these decisions established
only the point that, under statutes permitting a "public utility" to protest
3ome extra-franchise conduct of another public utility, an electrical coop
is not deemed to be a "public utility." These three decisions, contrary to
the implication of some of the language of the Black River case, do not at
all deal with or consider the question whether an electrical coop might
have standing under some other statutory provision such as CODE OF LAWS
OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 24-67 (1952). Two of' the other cases relied on in
Black River, apparently to support its decision on standing, do not deal
with the standing issue, but rule either that a coop has no exclusive
service area, Sheridan Co. Elec. Coop. Inc. v. Montana-Dakota Utilities
Co., 120 Mont. 84, 270 P. 2d 742 (1954), or that the challenged utility was
operating in an area served by it before the statute's effective date, i. e.,
operating under "grandfather" rights, Wattsburg Tel. Coop. Ass'n. v.
Pennsylvania Pub. Utility Comm'n., 182 Pa. Super. 594, 128 A. 2d 160
(1956). No one of these cases considered any statute eniploving a statutory
test such as the "interested person" standard of CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, § 24-67 (1952).
SOUTH CAROLINA,
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standing before the court (or agency) to seek and secure
28
its protection.
Moreover, it is not essential that there be some specific
statutory provision recognizing and defining standing in
order for a court (or an agency) to protect a person's "legal
right," for if such a right exists, the court will normally
exercise its jurisdiction to protect that right on the fundamental principle that a right ordinarily imports a remedy.
This principle applies in regulatory statutes as well as ordinary common law matters. Thus, if a regulatory statute
authorizes the filing of a complaint challenging administrative
action but does not specify who may file the complaint, the
courts will apply the concept of "legal right" to determine
who may do so;29 certainly, a stricter test should not be
applied to determine who has standing to go before an administrative agency in the first instance.
From this it follows that if the legislature does go further
and does set forth in the statute some specific test of standing,
such as "any interested person," the legislature must have
intended to broaden the category of persons who have standing. Otherwise, the statutory provision does no more than
to codify the "legal right" test which the courts presumably
would apply absent such a provision. Since the legislature
might have in fact declared a "legal right" test, the fact
that it did not do so and that it used some other more
broadly worded test, suggests that it intended to expand the
right to go to administrative agencies or courts for relief.
Particularly in a complex regulatory statute, far removed
from the common law context, the use of a statutory test
of standing, such as "any interested person," is especially
persuasive that the statute was designed to go beyond the
relatively restrictive "legal right" concept.
Thus, the "legal right" concept is, standing alone, not
really a test of standing at all. At most, it is a form of words
indicating that there are circumstances which will move a
court or agency at least to hear the person who claims to
28. Professor Davis makes the same point as follows: "Circular reasoning is very common, for one of the questions asked in order to determine
whether a plaintiff has standing is whether the plaintiff has a legal right,
but the question whether the plaintiff has a legal right is the final conclusion, for if the plaintiff has standing his interest is a legally-protected
interest, and that is what is meant by a legal right." 3 DAviS, AnminISTRATVE LAW § 22.04 (1958).
29. See notes 31-33, infra.
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have been damaged, so that the whole question is whether
there are facts or other circumstances which make it appropriate for that person to be heard by agency or court. And
there are many circumstances which can determine the appropriateness vel non of recognizing standing in a given
case, whether this be to petition the agency or the court.
These circumstances cannot be found solely by the use of a
phrase such as "legal right," which, indeed, is the result,
rather than the starting point, of the analysis of the problem.
2. We can leave to one side the fact that the statute itself
may specifically say who may seek agency or judicial action.
The "electrical utility" standard of § 24-68 is precisely in,
point. Here the question is merely one of construing the term
to determine whether some particular person is encompassed
in its meaning, and that is what the Court did when it
concluded that coops are not "electrical utilities." And in
doing so, the Court adopted the correct approach: it looked
at the rights, duties, status, and overall functions of coops to
conclude that a coop is not an "electrical utility" and should
not possess its privileges.
3. An issue - different in degree rather than in kind arises when the statutory provision is a broad term such
as "interested person"e or "person" or "party affected" or
"adversely affected." The same technique should be used,
that is to say, to decide whether the particular person who
asserts standing is the kind of person who should be admitted
into one of these broad statutory classifications.
One way to answer this question is to decide whether a
given petitioner is a person whom the statute is intended
to protect. This can be deduced, sometimes from particular
sections, sometimes from the statute as a whole, and sometimes (especially where legislative history is thought significant) from the declared intentions of the legislative body.
For example, the Interstate Commerce Act comprehensively
regulates the interstate activities of railroads and motor
carriers (water carriers to a lesser degree). The orthodox
theory is that Commission regulation is a substitute for free
market competition which, rightly or wrongly, is thought
unsatisfactory in the case of these utilities. Thus, if an
ICC decision favorable to one railroad damages a competing
railroad, it is only fair that the latter have standing to secure
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a review of the ICC order, and the United States Supreme
Court has so held.30 Similarly, truckers may attack ICC
orders favoring railroad over trucker interests, 3 ' and vice
versa,32 e.g., grants of operating authority which may divert
traffic from the favored carrier. Here, it is fair usage of
language to say that a "legal right" is being asserted by
the railroad or trucker who claims to be hurt by the ICC
order. Practically speaking, judicial review may be the only
recourse for the injured party, since, by hypothesis, freemarket competition has been eliminated or greatly reduced.
The converse is that the statute may not be designed to
protect a particular person who, on the principles so far
developed, should therefore not have standing. Again ICC
orders afford an example. The Supreme Court has held
that a shipper, long benefitting from unduly preferential
rail rates, lacked standing to attack the ICC order which
equalized rail rates, incidentally eliminating his favored status
and competitive advantage.3 3 On the statutory protection
test, clearly, standing should be denied to one who has long
grown fat on unlawful preferences and advantages which
should never (theoretically) have existed. Again, it is possible, though not especially helpful, to say that the shipper
had no "legal right" to the unlawful preference, and thus no
standing. The same argument applies to the language in
Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick,34 upon which the South Carolina
Court relied in Black River. There the Court quoted language
from an early federal decision 35 equating "interest" with
30. In the Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258 (1924), the relevant
provision of the Interstate Commerce Act was that "suit to enjoin, set

aside, annul or suspend any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
shall be brought in the district court." See 28 U. S. C. § 1336 (1960).

The statute says nothing as to the persons who may institute such a suit.

The Supreme Court of the United States held that one railroad adversely

affected by an ICC order favorable to a competing railroad had standing
to attack the ICC order. See the explanation of the case in Alexander
Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U. S.249 (1929).
31. American Trucking Ass'ns. v. United States, 364 U. S.1 (1960);
Cf. Claiborne Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U. S.382 (1932)
(ferry company opposes railroad extension).
32. Alton R. R. v. United States, 315 U. S. 15 (1942).
33. In Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U. S. 249
(1929), the Court held that a shipper had no standing to file a complaint
attacking an ICC order because he had no independent "legal right," but
noted that he nevertheless had standing to participate in the administrative
proceeding. Generally, as this case shows, standing is more readily accorded before an administrative agency than in the court by which the
administrative action is reviewed.
34. 355 U. S.151 (1957).
35. Moffatt Tunnell League v. United States, 289 U. S.113, 119 (1933).
Various statements in Moffatt Tunnell reinforce the proposition that the
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"legal right," but in holding that the petitioners in Alleghany
had no standing to institute an independent equity action
(as distinguished from proceeding before the Commission),
the Court fully examined the nature of the asserted interests
and convincingly demonstrated that no harm was done to
those interests by the action sought to be reviewed. Moreover,
these cases, especially Alleghany, are not persuasive, for they
were an effort by the Court, in the absence of a statutory
criterion, to fashion on its own a test of standing for an
independent suit in equity, after the administrative agency
has acted. Naturally, such a test would be more restrictively
drawn than one to determine who may institute a suit before
the administrative agency itself, especially if the legislature
has employed language which displays an intention to broaden
standing.
Needless to say, it is often difficult to determine whether
some asserted interest is one to be protected, since this
may involve a full analysis of the statutes. For instance,
the subsequent discussion of the standing issue in the Camp
case 36 is an effort to show, from the relevant statutes, why
the Soil District there should have been held entitled to
judicial review, i.e. why its interests deserved a court hearing.
But this sort of full statutory analysis is inescapable in most
significant cases arising under a regulatory statute. The
formula "legal right" does not promote this analysis. At
best, its use forces the necessary inquiry back another step
to the question: what is the statutory basis for saying that
rules regarding standing in Interstate Commerce Commission cases are inapplicable when the legislature has declared a statutory test of standing
such as "interested person." Moffatt Tunnell was an equity action (to

enjoin the ICC order) by an unincorporated association of citizens interested in certain commercial

and transportation improvements.

"These

leagues are not corporations, quasi-corporations or organized pursuant to

or recognized by any law. Neither is a person in law and, unless authorized by statute, they have no capacity to sue." 289 U. S. at 118.

The state law on the status of such groups was not explained, but clearly

"there is no federal statute that purports to give any unincorporated
voluntary association standing to bring suit to set aside an order of the

Commission." Id. at 119. Moreover, since a suit to review an ICC order
rests upon

Congressional

consent to sue,

the absence

of any such

authorization for unincorporated association to sue is fatal here." Ibid.
It is against the background of these statements by the Court that it
held that the unincorporated association lacked standing to file the inis no more
junctive action against the ICC order, for "[tiheir interest ...

than a sentiment, such as may be entertained by members of the public in
the territory [involved], that the improvement of transportation facilities
authorized by the Commission will lessen the possibility of construction
by a rival of the Rio Grande of an extension of the Moffatt to Utah
common points." Ibid.
36. Infra at pp. 18-19.
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there is, or is not, a "legal right"? Hence, the task of
closely examining the statute cannot be foresworn by recourse to a formula, especially when that formula merely
states a conclusion - that one's interest asserted is sufficiently important to command agency or court protection,
i.e., one has standing to go to the agency or court.
4. There is a further, highly persuasive line of authoritysetting forth a different, or more accurately, a complementary, test of standing. This is best illustrated by constructinga hypothetical case on the statute construed in Black River§ 24-67 authorizes "any interested person, corporation, or
municipality" to challenge unlawful electric utility operations>
i.e. those which are not validated by a statutorily required
certificate of public convenience and necessity. Suppose,
for example, that such a utility exceeded the terms of its
certificate by operating in an area where clearly it had no
authority to operate, and no one of the statutory "grandfather" exemptions legalized its operations. Let us further
suppose that no other regulated utility was operating in that
area, thus foreclosing any § 24-68 challenge by another
"electrical utility." Who now has standing to challenge
the utility's unlawful operations? That is to say, under §
24-67, who is entitled to be free, as a matter of legal right,
from the competition of the offending utility, since that is in
essence the standard which Black River lays down for interpreting "interested person, corporation, or municipality"?
Under this interpretation, it may well be that no one has
§ 24-67 standing. Presumably the Commission might do so
on its own motion, but it may be unable or unwilling to do so.
The short of it is that the unlawful action of the utility in our
hypothetical case may never be considered by the Commission
because no one has standing under Black River's "legal interest" test to initiate a proceeding. But this is scarcely a
satisfactory situation, if only because there is some "public
interest" in seeing that even electric utilities keep within the
law and within the confines of their state-granted franchises.
A comparable problem has frequently arisen in the federal
system in the context of standing to secure judicial review
of administrative action. The classic decision interpreted
a provision of the Communications Act of 1934 that "any...
person aggrieved, or whose interests are adversely affected"
by action of the Federal Communications Commission may
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secure judicial review in the appropriate Court of Appeals. s 7
In FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,38 the TelegraphHerald sought a permit for a station in Dubuque, Iowa.
Shortly thereafter, Sanders, which already had a license to
operate in East Dubuque, Illinois, directly across the Mississippi River from Dubuque, Iowa, sought to move its transmitter to a more favorable location in Dubuque. The FCC
granted both applications, although Sanders asserted that it
would be seriously harmed by the Telegraph-Herald's competition to its existing station, since the area advertising
revenues were inadequate to sustain both stations. The
issue before the Supreme Court was Sanders' standing to go
to court to attack the FCC order. The Court first held, applying the rule that a radio (or TV) station license is not a
property right, 9 that the licensee is not immune from competition since "the field of broadcasting is one of free competition."" 0 Therefore, Sanders had no "legal right" of its
own which it could assert. Thus, if the "legal right" criterion
is the sole test of standing, Sanders' review petition must be
dismissed, for, as the Commission argued, "it is impossible
that [the statute] was intended to give [Sanders] standing
41
to appeal, since absence of right implies absence of remedy."
Yet the Court unanimously held that Sanders did have
standing. For in enacting the statute, Congress:
may have been of opinion that one likely to be financially
injured by the issue of a license [to a competitor] would
be the only person having a sufficient interest to bring
to the attention of the appellate court errors of law in
the action of the Commission in granting the license.
to confer such stand1t is within the power of Congress
4
ing to prosecute an appeal. 1
"The significance of Sanders and its copious progeny is that
.a private party, although lacking some "legal right" of his
,own, may nevertheless have standing to voice some public
interest worth protecting. In Sanders, as in other FCC cases,
there is a public interest in good radio and TV service (which
37. Communications Act § 402(b) (6), 47 U. S. C. § 402(b) (6) (1960).
38. 309 U. S. 470 (1940).
39. Id. at 475 (1940). Cf. Motor Carrier Act, 49 U. S. C. 307(b);
Civil Aeronautics Act, 49 U. S. C. § 481(j); Atomic Energy Act of 1954
§§ 183-184, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2233-34.
40. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 474 (1940).
41. Id. at 477.
42. Ibid. (emphasis added).
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may be impossible if too many stations have to divide insufficient revenues too thinly); in all of these cases, there

is a public interest in guaranteeing correct decisions and fair
procedure by administrative agencies. Moreover, Sanders
was the best possible choice to assert the public interest;43
it was damaged in fact, if not in law, by the FCC action; it
had the economic incentives to collect and marshal the
arguments in the best tradition of the adversary system of
litigation; and thus it is the most likely candidate to spend
the time and trouble to apprise the reviewing court of the
relevant considerations as to the agency's action. Without
Sanders' "right" to review, the possibly erroneous FCC decision might never be reviewed by the courts.
Precisely the same considerations apply to Black River.
Clearly, the electric coop - like Sanders Brothers - has no
individual "legal right" of its own calling for protection by
court or agency. But just as clearly, there is a public interest
in assuring that regulated utilities conform to the terms of
their franchise, and that the Commission sees to it that
utilities do so. The electric coop or other "interested" person
is the ideal person to carry the burden of presenting to the
Commission all of the relevant considerations. Like Sanders,
the electric coop has been damaged in fact, if not injured
"in law," and therefore it is the one most likely to assert
effectively the public interest elements in the case. Again,
the considerations which moved Sanders to award standing
to secure court review absent "legal right" are even more
compelling when the issue is, as in Black River, the standing
to invoke a decision by the administrative agency. For
agencies usually have more flexible and informal procedures
to dispose quickly of issues; their dockets are not ordinarily
so crowded as those of courts. In the case of the Public Service Commission, such a proceeding as Black River sought to
institute is actually in aid of the Commission's performance
43. This point was reinforced in Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,

316 U. S. 4 (1942) where the Supreme Court held that a radio station

which had standing under the Sanders rule to seek review of an FCC
decision also had standing to apply for, and the court had jurisdiction to
award, a stay pending appeal. The Court again noted that the statute
"did not create new private rights," and that "private litigants have stand.
ing only as representatives of the public interest." The Court overrode
the conceptualistic objection of the dissenting justice that if there is no
showing that an individual's legal interests have been injured, there is only
damnum absque injuria, and therefore no "case or controversy" within the
meaning of Article I of the United States Constitution.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss1/3

12

Folk: Administrative Law
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

of its regulatory duties, 44 and many agencies will welcome
this. Certainly, the Commission, by recognizing Black River
as an "interested person," willingly accepted the case. And
there is an additional public benefit in that the expense and
trouble of the proceeding is largely borne by the "interested
person," thus saving the Commission and its personnel at
least some of the expense and trouble of conducting its own
investigation, as it must if it can act only on its own motion.
Both authority and reason, then, point to the conclusion
that statutes purporting to confer standing on "interested
persons" (and similarly on persons "affected" or "adversely
affected") 4 should not be narrowly confined to just those
who can show some "legal right," or are victims of a "legal
wrong." Not only are these persons an appropriate vehicle
for asserting and defending some public interest, but also
they themselves may well have some very real concern in the
matter which it is fair and just to consider. Thus, although
an existing savings and loan association may not be legally
injured by authorizing a competing institution, it may, in
fact, be seriously damaged. It is certainly consistent with
fairness to give the damaged association an opportunity
to appear before the agency and to go to court for judicial
review, and in the course of the procedure the ultimate decision of both agency and court is likely to benefit. And even
though the rationale is the assertion of the public interest by
the person claiming to be damaged, there is nothing inconsistent with the theory if, as a result of its efforts, it secures
a ruling favorable to itself. The important consideration
is that some public interest has been vindicated, and the
benefit to the complainant is only incidental, although the
possibility of personal benefit may furnish the motive for
46
his participation in the case.

44. There is nothing in the statutes to suggest that the standing of
interested persons to initiate Commission action interferes with its discretion to administer the statutes, for, indeed, the fact that standing is given
reflects a legislative judgment that "interested persons" have a role to
play, at least to the extent of invoking Commission jurisdiction.

45. These and like phrases frequently appear in regulatory statutes

and designate the persons who have standing to seek judicial review.
46. Judge Jerome Frank, in a notable opinion in Associated Industries

v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), dismissed as moot, 320 T3. S. 707
(1943),

analyzed the implications of Sanders and Scripps-Howard, and,

in a famous phrase, concluded that persons who had standiig to assert a
public interest "are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals." 134 F. 2d at
704. Since Congress can constitutionally authorize the Attorney General to

institute suit, so long as a "case or controversy" is presented, "[i]nstead of
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Secondly, because both agencies and courts have become

increasingly willing to consider the interests of persons who
may be affected by or are interested in some matter, there

has been a long-run tendency to broaden the law of standing
to secure judicial review, and of the right to petition an
agency or to intervene in an existing proceeding before an

agency. Thus, even though newspapers have no "legal right"
to be free of TV and radio competition, they have, realistically

viewed, an interest or concern in station license grants, and
accordingly their standing has been recognized. 4

This il-

lustrates the now virtually established federal rule that competitors generally have standing to protest administrative
action affecting their interests. 48 Standing has similarly been

accorded to consumers,4 9 to municipalities, 05 and to business, 51 labor, 52 and civic organizations to give voice to their

interests, and thus contribute to a better informed decision
by the agency, in the first instance, and then by the court.
Two limiting considerations are appropriately observed.

First, these arguments do not lead to the conclusion, either
necessarily or by implication, that the test of standing is or

should be, as Professor Davis seems to suggest, that anyone
who is, in fact, hurt in some way is entitled to go to court or
designating the Attorney General, or some other public officer, to bring
such preceedings, Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring
on any non-official person ... authority to bring a suit to prevent action
by an officer in violation of his statutory powers." Ibid.
47. See Note, Competitors' Standing to Challenge Administrative Action
under the APA, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 843 (1956).
48. City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F. 2d 741 (D. C. Cir. 1956) (opposed
interests of petroleum and natural gas producers); National Coal Ass'n.
v. FPC, 191 F. 2d 462 (D. C. Cir. 1951) (opposed interests of natural gas
and coal producers); American Pres. Lines v. FMB, 112 F. Supp. 346
(D. D. C. 1953) (shipping company attacks subsidy to a competitor).
49. Pollak v. Public Utilities Comm'n., 191 F. 2d 450 (D. C. Cir. 1951)
(bus passengers object to loudspeakers which Commission permitted installed in busses). Cf. United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n., 151 F.
2d 609 (D. C. Cir. 1945) (United States may object to an order favoring
the District of Columbia utility from which it purchases power for government buildings, etc.).
50. City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F. 2d 741 (D. C. Cir. 1956) (city
had standing to object to FPC order which would permit a natural gas
producer to divert facilities from the city, thus potentially impairing
service or increasing costs to citizens of the city).
51. Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943) (association of coal consumers had standing to object to coal price rise).
52. International Union of Elec., Radio & Machine Workers v. United
States, 280 F. 2d 645 (D. C. Cir. 1960) (labor union had standing to object
to Atomic Energy Commission's grant of a reactor construction permit
near a large industrial area), reversed on other grounds, 367 U. S. 396
(1961).
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before the agency. 3 Indeed, this is too inclusive a test, for
it implies that virtually anyone who can demonstrate some
remote or consequential or indirect harm has standing, without any satisfactory stopping point, at least short of a
de minimis effect. Such extreme results are to be avoided,
certainly not encouraged. And it is improbable that such
would occur in South Carolina administrative law, even if, as
this article urges, standing before agency and court should
be broadly recognized. Any such expansive tendencies can
be checked if standing is awarded or denied under either
of these alternative tests: (1) whether the petitioner asserts
some interest which, viewed realistically, the statute is designed to foster, and (2), whether he is in a position to
present, for the benefit of court or agency, or both, some
considerations which it is important for the tribunal to know
about and act upon, that is, whether he asserts some public
interest. And generally, it is preferable to grant rather than
to deny standing, at least up to the point where the number
of parties becomes inconvenient or burdensome, or threatens
to impose significant delay upon the proceedings, or to
encumber the case with marginal side-issues.
Secondly, it should always be recalled that the grant of
standing implies nothing as to the ultimate outcome on the
merits. It is fully consistent with recognizing one's standing
in administrative proceedings, for the court or agency to
decide adversely to him on the merits, as is, indeed, constantly the case when any plaintiff, with impeccable credentials in court, loses his case. The same has also been true
in administrative law cases as well. But within reasonable
limits, the administrative process, including the role of the
courts, is strengthened by generously permitting standing
and then meeting the issues on their merits.
STANDING OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES TO SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF EACH OTHER'S ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

It is often assumed, partly because of political rhetoric and
partly because of misconceiving the true nature of government, that government, both federal and state, is a monolithic
structure. From this, it follows that "the" government
necessarily represents one point of view. In the courts, this
can mean that the government can take only one position on
53. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIsE § 22.02 (1958).
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a given matter, and that one agency of government cannot
oppose the action taken by some other agency or authority.
Even federal courts, while permitting federal agencies to
challenge each other's action, instinctively recoil at the idea
that "[t]he United States may incestuously sue itself," 54 as
the Supreme Court of the United States permitted in United
States v. ICC.55
The reality of Government is otherwise. For both state and
especially the federal government represent a vast aggregation of interests which diverge from, even contradict, each
other. This is due, of course, to the fact that political
pressures from one group or another translate themselves into
laws which are inconsistent on occasions, or at least are
susceptible to being inconsistently administered. This is especially the case when regulatory programs are administered
by agencies which are specifically charged with promoting,
as vigorously and effectively as possible, the objectives of the
statute under which they operate. As long as all administrative agencies are subject to some effective continuing and
common control, e.g., by the executive or by the legislature,
conflicts can be resolved (at least within the limitations of
time and political expediency). But when some or all administrative agencies are set up so as to be "independent" of the
legislature or executive, there is no easy way in which conflicting interests can be settled effectively. The stock example
comes from the federal system: the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the oldest of the "independent" agencies, acting
within its jurisdiction, may well make decisions which implement the policy of one of its statutes but which at the
same time injures (1) the specific monetary interests of the
federal Government as a shipper or (2) the interest which
some other federal agency has in the administration of its
statute. An example of the former is the interest of the
Defense Department in securing the lowest possible rates for
transporting military supplies; an example of the latter
is the concern of the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice to prevent undue concentration of power through
54. JAFFE, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75
HARV. L. REv. 255, 300 (1961).
55. United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n. [and United States]
et al., 337 U. S. 426 (1949). The United States appeared as a plaintiff
in its capacity of a shipper seeking reparations and damages for exaction
of an allegedly unlawful rate; it appears as a defendant because 28
U. S. C. § 2322 requires that any action to set aside an ICC order "shall
be brought .. against the United States."
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railroad mergers in the face of a possibly different attitude
by the Interstate Commerce Commission." When such policy
conflicts arise, it is a serious question how they are to be
resolved. Since the Interstate Commerce Commission, in our
example, is an "independent" agency, the President cannot
resolve its conflict with the Defense or Justice Departments.5 7
And Congress cannot conveniently sit as a tribunal to resolve
all possible conflicts within the Government, if only because
there are too many other pressing national problems for its
consideration, leaving aside its notorious inefficiency. The
question, then, is whether the third branch - the judiciary must undertake to resolve conflicts, within the limits of the
competence of courts, including (so far as possible) the
avoidance of "political" controversies.
A. The Facts in Camp. This complex problem is not
peculiarly federal. Indeed, it was presented, apparently for
the first time in this state, in Camp v. Board of Public
Works.5 5 Three agencies were involved, each with its own
special statutory interests. The Cherokee County Soil Conservation District (the "District") was arrayed as plaintiff
against the South Carolina Water Pollution Control Authority
(the "Authority") and the Board of Public Works of the
City of Gaffney (the "Board"). 9 The District's functions
are, broadly speaking, to "conserve the soil resources of the
State and control or prevent soil erosion,"0 0 and in fact
the Cherokee District had developed a plan to create an
extensive watershed on Thicketty Creek by damming this
waterway and its tributaries and by artificial lakes; this
plan would conserve a large tract of land, make available
previously bottom land, and serve both irrigation and, eventually, recreational purposes. 61 Effective implementation of
this plan required from the Authority an "A" classification
of Thicketty Creek. Classification of streams is made by the
Authority whose statutory objective is "to abate, control,
and prevent the pollution of the waters of" South Carolina. 2
56. Cf. the conflict between the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice and the Comptroller of the Currency and, to a lesser extent, the
Federal Reserve Board regarding bank mergers.
57. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935).
58. 238 S. C. 461, 120 S.E. 2d 681 (1961).
59. For purposes of this discussion, we may treat state and municipal
agencies as involving no relevant differences.
60. 238 S.C. 461 at 463, 120 S. E. 2d 681 at 682.
61. Id at 466, 120 S. E. 2d at 683.
62. Id at 464, 120 S.R. 2d at 682, quoting CODE OF LAWS OF SoUTH
CAROLINA, § 70-101 (1952).
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For example, a permit from the Authority is necessary to
construct a new, or alter or change or add to an existing,
sewage disposal system. The Board of Public Works of
Gaffney manages the Gaffney waterworks and sewage disposal systems. For many years, Gaffney sewage and industrial waste has been discharged into Beaverdam Creek, a

tributary of Thicketty Creek, and for this purpose both

waterways had the usual "C" classification. 63 In 1959,
Beaverdam was reclassified downward to "C-a" in order to

permit the Board to carry through its plan to enlarge its
disposal plant on Beaverdam Creek. Later, the District
applied to reclassify Thicketty Creek upward to "A," but

this application was denied in June 1960, and followed in
August 1960 by the Authority's granting the permit needed
by the Board to enlarge the Beaverdam disposal plant.
The District instituted an action to set aside the permit
issued by the Authority to the Board and to enjoin any action
by the Board under the permit. The issue of the District's
standing was raised by demurrer which was overruled, following which, after hearing, the trial court set aside the permit
on the merits. The Supreme Court reversed solely on the
ground of the District's lack of standing to sue, without
reaching the merits which the trial court had resolved in

the District's favor.
In dealing with the "delicate" question of standing6 4 in

this "rather unusual situation of litigation between three

public agencies," 65 the Court assumed that "under some

circumstances," not defined, "one public agency may attack
the action of another." 66 The criterion is unclear. Thus, the
Court asserts that, to sustain such an action, the complaining
agency "must at least show that it has some special interest
from [sic: for?] which it is charged with responsibility that
may be adversely affected by the action attacked."'' T (Emphasis added). The Court attaches significance to the fact

that the District has "no responsibility with reference to
63. Streams are clarified, in descending order of purity, from "AA"
(suitable for domestic and food processing purposes) to "D" (apparently
too impure for any use). Class "C" is water suitable for propagation of
fish, industrial and agricultural uses and other uses requiring waters of
lesser quality" than "A" and "B." 230 S. C. 461 at 465, 120 S. E. 2d
at 682-683.
64. Id. at 467, 120 S. E. 2d at 684.
65. Id. at 463, 120 S. E. 2d at 682.
66. Id. at 469, 120 S.E. 2d at 685.
67. Id. at 469, 120 S.E. 2d at 685.
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the pollution of streams," but only with soil conservation,
and that the Authority's action "does not affect" their
interests in flood control or soil conservation. 68 Again, the
Court, without explanation, seemingly attaches significance
to the form of the action, differentiating this proceeding
to set aside and enjoin a permit from a declaratory judgment as to the "respective powers with reference to any
matter in dispute between" agencies. 69 In finding no standing in this case, the Court heavily relies on United States
ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Commn'n., 70 a federal
Court of Appeals decision denying standing to the Secretary
of the Interior to challenge a Federal Power Commission
dam construction license, but scarcely notes the Supreme
Court's unanimous reversal on this point. 71
B. A careful study of the statutes governing the District,
the Authority and the Board rather clearly shows that, contrary to the Court's conclusion, the District's interests were
of a character justifying, as the trial court found, the District's standing to challenge the Authority's award to the
Board. Again, it must be emphasized that a ruling on standing
implies nothing as to the outcome on the merits, for the two
issues are logically distinct, that is to say, there is nothing
logically incompatible in deciding the merits in any case
against the party held to have standing to raise the issues.
1. No provision in the Water Pollution Control Act expressly or impliedly precludes a public authority such as the
District from challenging action of the Authority. Indeed,
the statutory scheme indicates that judicial review is to be
favored. Thus S. C. Code § 70-131 provides for review at the
instance of "any person," the term "person" being defined
in § 70-101 (1) to include a "government agency." Hence
it seems inappropriate that the District would be refused
standing for § 70-131 review purposes on such a broad
definition, absent overwhelming contrary reasons.
2. S. C. Code § 70-131 affords a statutory form of review.
Ordinarily, this can be taken to exclude other forms of review, for example, an action, as in the present case, to set
aside a permit and enjoin operations under it. Two reasons
should prevent this usual exclusionary rule from applying
68. Id. at 470, 120 S. E. 2d at 685.
69. Id.at 469, 120 S. E. 2d at 685.
70. 191 F. 2d 796 (4th Cir. 1952).

71. 345 U. S. 153, 156 (1953).
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in this instance. First, S. C. Code § 70-137 specifically declares that the statutory remedies are cumulative "and nothing
herein contained shall abridge or alter rights of action in the
civil courts or remedies existing in equity or under the common law or statutory law2' That is to say, the statutory
review form is solely supplementary, not exclusive. Second,
even if this authoritative pronouncement were lacking, it
would be unjust to preclude review by common law or equitable remedies under the allegations of the complaint in this
case. It was alleged, and nothing showed the allegations to
be frivolous or insubstantial, that no hearing was held on
the downward reclassification of Beaverdam Creek; the
record also showed that no order was issued as required by
the statute and no testimony was transcribed. Thus, it is
difficult to see how there could have been any review in the
statutory form (S. C. Code § 70-131) which envisions review
on a record. Moreover, the courts have long permitted nonstatutory relief when there have been procedural irregularities
at the administrative level, including, as here, a failure to
observe the agency's own rules. Hence, review should have
been available on the demand of the District.
3. The Court was clearly on sound ground in attempting
to formulate some limitation as to the persons entitled to
challenge administrative action of the Authority. This is
not the type of situation where the Court should entertain
a "citizen's action" irrespective of his interest, as in the
common law rule that any citizen has sufficient interest in
confining courts to their proper jurisdiction that he always
has standing to apply for a writ of prohibition.72 Thus, we
may assume arguendo the correctness of a test of "special
interest" or "adverse affect" to determine standing of the
District to challenge the Authority's action.
But even on this test, the District seemed clearly to have
the requisite "interest." Thus, under S. C. Code § 70-114,
the Authority, in classifying waters, must give attention
to the character of the surrounding lands and to "its peculiar
suitability for the particular uses and with a view to conserving it and encouraging the most appropriate use of the
lands bordering on such waters for . . . agricultural . . .
purposes."
72. JAFFE, Standing to Secure JudicialReview: Public Actions,

74 HAMw.

L. REV. 1265, 1274 (1961) ; DE SMITH, JuDcIAL. REvIEw OF ADMINISTRATIVE

ACTION, 308-310 (prohibition), 310-313 (certiorari)
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But the district had precisely such an interest in this matter
which the Authority must consider and which allegedly it did
not consider. Moreover, under its own organic statute, the
District is entitled to call on "any or all State or local agencies
for cooperation in carrying out the provisions of" the Soil
Conservation Act.7 3 Since the District had the power to
draw up a soil conservation plan, and in fact had done so,
it seems reasonable to suppose that, in order effectively to
implement the plan and to protect it from disruption by the
action of other agencies, state or municipal, it should have
standing to challenge any such disrupting action. Even if no
one of these statutory provisions is sufficient alone to confer
standing, together they make out a very strong case. This
conclusion is wholly apart from those specific factual allegations and showings which would, in a particular case,
warrant standing for a particular litigant.
4. The Camp decision wrongly framed the standing issue
when it asked whether the District had "any jurisdiction over
pollution of streams or other waters of the State." 74 The
answer obviously is that it does not, and indeed no one else
does except the Authority itself. So framed, this "test"
carries the presumably unintended implication that only the
Authority has standing to seek review of its own decisions.
Taking as correct the statement that agencies, such as the
District, have only the powers expressly or by necessary
implication conferred by statute upon them, this proposition is
relevant, not to the law of standing, but to the regulatory
powers of the agency. Indeed, it is much more aptly applied
to the Authority whose action was being challenged, inter alia,
as outside its statutory powers; and one of the chief roles of
judicial review is precisely that of keeping an agency within
its granted powers. By thus posing the wrong question regarding standing, the Court avoided considering the grounds
for standing.
C. We put to one side those arguments which indicate
that the District's standing should have been recognized, and
consider broader aspects of the problem of standing as between
public agencies.
1. It is unfortunate that courts, especially state courts, are
reluctant to accord standing to one agency to challenge
73. CODE or LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 63-68 (1952).
74. 238 S. C. at 470, 120 S. E. 2d at 685 (1961).
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another agency's action. Cases in various jurisdictions show
this to be often true. Sometimes this turns on the wording
of particular statutes. Apart from such a situation, it is often
argued that an agency is essentially like a court, and, like
a court, it has no interest in its ruling as soon as it has
entered its final decision.7 5 This argument altogether ignores
the fact that agencies, although often similar to courts, are
usually given affirmative duties to make policy and actively
to carry out a regulatory program.7 6 Hence, they may well
have a definite, concrete interest in securing a court determination of a question of law or an application of law to fact.
Moreover, if, unlike courts, agencies are statutory defendants
when their orders and other action are challenged, and thus
may actively put to the courts the policy grounds defending
their decisions, it seems oddly inconsistent to say that they
cannot take the initiative in securing court review, as when
an agency decision is set aside by a lower court. Thus,
agency responsibility for administering a regulatory program
should supply it with the necessary interest to take to court,
action by another agency which arguably has an adverse
effect on the regulatory interests of the petitioning agency.
2. The Camp decision dramatically illustrates the divergence
of interests and of statutory policies within even a relatively
uncomplicated state governmental structure such as that
of South Carolina. The vital interests of the District and the
Board were in conflict, and when the Authority resolved that
conflict in favor of the Board, it was reasonable to permit
the District to secure review. Cases from other states also
point up the conflict of interests within government although
the resolution of the standing question by the various courts
cannot be harmonized. Thus in Massachusetts, a town was
held to be "an aggrieved party" with standing to attack an
order of the state utilities commission discontinuing passenger
service to the community.7 7 On the other hand, a Connecticut
town board of education was without standing to seek a
75. JAFFE, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75
HARv. L. REV. 255, 296 (1961); f. Department of Labor v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 362 Pa. 342, 67 A. 2d 114 (1949).
76. See Rommell v. Walsh, 127 Conn. 16, 22, 15 A. 2d 6, 9 (1940):

"Administrative boards differ radically from courts because frequently

in the performance of their duties they are representing such [public]

interests, whereas courts are concerned with litigating the rights of parties
with adverse interests who appear before them."
77. Wilmington v. Department of Pub. Utilities, 340 Mass. 432, 165
N. E. 2d 99 (1960).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss1/3

22

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

Folk: Administrative Law

[[Vol. 15

declaratory relief against the local board of finance on the
ground that it was a "controversy essentially political" that
the courts would not arbitrate.78 Courts have split on the
right of an administrative agency to challenge in court the
decision of an independent adjudicatory tribunal within
the agency. West Virginia, for instance, permitted the Director of Unemployment Compensation to appeal a trial
court judgment affirming denial of a claim by the Board of
Review of Unemployment Compensation,"9 for he is "entitled
to prosecute appeals to bring about what he believes to be a
fair and correct interpretation of the statutes under which
he operates."80 In a nearly identical case, the Pennsylvania
court refused such an appeal by the state Department of
Labor and Industry, chiefly on a close construction of statutory language S.'
The most striking illustration is United States ex rel.
Chapman v. Federal Power Commission 2 in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Secretary of
the Interior had standing to challenge an FPC order permitting a public utility to construct a dam. The Secretary's interest was that if the Government rather than the utility
constructed the dam (as it might under a river basin development plan approved by Congress under the Flood Control
Act), surplus electric power generated by the dam would be
sold under the Secretary's authority.8 3 Whatever one may
think of the remoteness of the interest asserted, it is clear
that there was a real controversy between the regulatory concerns of an officer of the executive branch and an "independent" administrative agency. In a subsequent case, a
Court of Appeals found that a state administrative agency
had standing to attack a Federal Power Commission order.8 4
3. Whatever should be the test of private parties' standing
to challenge administrative action, it would seem that the
proper approach, in the case of public authorities, is to resolve
doubts in favor of their standing to attack the orders and
actions of other agencies and officers. Unike the private
78. Board of Educ. v. Board of Finance, 127 Conn. 345, 16 A. 2d 601
(1940).
79. State v.Hix, 132 W. Va. 516, 54 S.E. 2d 198 (1949).
80. Id. at 134, 54 S. E. 2d at 199-200.
81. Department of Labor v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 362 Pa.
342, 67 A. 2d 114 (1949).
82. 345 U. S. 153, 156 (1953), rev'g., 191 F. 2d. 796 (1952).
83. 191 F. 2d 796 at 799.
84. Public Util. Comm'n. v. FPC, 205 F. 2d 116, 119 (3d Cir. 1953).
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litigant, the public authority is representing, or purporting to
represent, his conception of the public interest; and since
this is presumably in aid of his efforts to carry out the
statute he administers, he should be encouraged, not discouraged. Courts need not be apprehensive that "political"
issues will be put to them in such cases; and, in fact, if a
question is "political" in character, it is consistent with the
law of standing to dismiss the case as involving a non-justiciable issue. Just as in other cases, the issues are likely to
be questions of the interpretation of statutes - an area in
which .courts are presumably expert; other issues will be
those typical of administrative law cases - sufficiency of the
evidence, propriety of the order, etc. Again, administrative
agencies have an especially strong interest in securing definitive resolution of various issues, especially questions of law,
and direct court action by one agency against another agency
is likely to bring the issue to a sharp focus and to enable the
court better to decide the question than if the burden is
carried, if at all, by some aggrieved private party who will
likely have other issues to present. Inter-agency disputes of
this character are likely to occur so seldom that even if the
courts granted standing in every one of them the increased
burden on court dockets would probably be imperceptible.
1962]

For these reasons, it seems appropriate for the courts to
exercise their normal review jurisdiction when one agency
proceeds against another, and not to avoid a ruling on the
merits by denying standing. Since there is likely to be no
other authoritative source to resolve the conflict, the courts
are the appropriate tribunal, so long as the issues are those
ordinarily within the compass of courts. Thus, liberally
according standing to public bodies, such as the District in
the Camp case, does not involve undue expansion of the
jurisdiction of courts, e.g., to render advisory opinions to
agencies when such are unavailable to private aggrieved
parties, or to pass on "political questions." That is to say,
borrowing federal constitutional concepts, it is assumed that
there is a genuine "case or controversy" because of the very
nature of the interests involved and affected, as indeed there
is in such litigation as Camp or the other previously cited
examples. Thus, the court should be generous in according
standing to administrative agencies to challenge orders of
other agencies, for otherwise important legal questions, af-
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fecting the action of these public bodies, may remain unresolved, at least until the fortuituous circumstances when some
private litigant wishes to pursue the issue in the courts. And
in South Carolina, the Black River decision points to a rather
restrictive attitude towards the standing of individual litigants.
OTHER JUDICIAL REVIEW PROBLEMS

A. Exhaustion of AdministrativeRemedies
In Walsh v. United States Rubber Co.,s5 the Court dismissed
an issue tendered to it because it had not been properly presented to the agency and thus was not ripe for judicial
determination. Here, an employer petitioned the Industrial
Commission to discontinue compensation payments, to a~n
employee who allegedly had now obtained suitable employment. The single commissioner dismissed the petition for
want of jurisdiction.8 6 Instead of appealing this ruling to the
full Commission, the employer started a show cause proceeding in court which upheld continued payments on the merits.
The Supreme Court dismissed this determination as improperly made since the company failed to follow orderly
procedure in first seeking review by the full Commission after
which judicial action could be properly invoked.8 7 This ruling
is a correct application of the fundamental requirement that
administrative remedies be exhausted.
The failure to exhaust administrative remedies 'was adverted to in Betterson v. Stewart" where the Court upheld
the dismissal of a complaint seeking dismissal from the
public school system of an allegedly unfit high school principal, since the issue had not been previously submitted to
the County Board of Trustees for their action in the matter.
The Court concluded that, for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies "the courts are without jurisdiction in the matter"
and that such a "jurisdictional question . . . relates to the
85. 238 S. C. 411, 120 S. E. 2d 685 (1961).
86. Since the basic award was on appeal to the courts, the commissioner thought that he had lost jurisdiction of the application to discontinue
payments.
87. Id. at 423-425, 120 S. E. 2d at 691-693.
88. 238 S. 0. 574, 121 S. E. 2d 102 (1961). Dealing with unrelat&I
counts in the complaint initiating this action, the Supreme Court also held
that the trial court should conduct an accounting for certain funds which
allegedly had come into the hands of the high school principal, and that the
accounting which had so far been made was insufficient. For this purpose,
the case was remanded.
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subject matter of the action" and can therefore "be and should
be taken notice of by the Court ex moro motu."'s The holding
of this case - that the court would not take cognizance of
the case before the administrative body has passed on it - is
indisputably correct, and is sustained by overwhelming authority both in this State and elsewhere 0 However, the
choice of language is unfortunate, since the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies does not destroy the jurisdiction of
the court, at least not in the usual sense of the word. Rather,
the exhaustion requirement is a rule of discretion by which
the courts decline to exercise their jurisdiction on the ground
that the action would be premature and possibly fruitless if
the litigants have not gone through administrative remedies.
The fact that the exhaustion requirement is not "jurisdictional" in the strict sense of the word is apparent from
the fact that the courts waive the exhaustion requirement
when, in their judgment, it is essential to do so in order to
obtain justice for the litigants. 9 1 Even though the matter is,
to some degree, semantic, it is important to recognize that,
given appropriate circumstances, the exhaustion rule will
be overriden and the court will take jurisdiction of the case
and decide it on its own. The dictum in Betterson is disturbing because of its implications that, without exhaustion, jurisdiction is as truly absent as in the case, for instance, when a
court with only a small-claims jurisdiction purports to
adjudicate a claim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, or
when a civil case is brought in a court of exclusively criminal
jurisdiction, etc. It is, however, quite appropriate for the
court to take note, on its own motion, of the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and therefore to decline the case.
But again this should not rest on the proposition that jurisdiction of the subject matter may not derive from consent of
the parties. Rather, it should be grounded on the correct
foundation of the exhaustion requirement - that as a matter
of sound discretion the court will not prematurely hear the
case, even when the parties are agreeable to it, because it is
desirable, perhaps essential, from the standpoint of public
policy that the appropriate administrative agencies first hear
and determine the questions involved.
89. Id. at 579-580, 121 S. E. 2d at 104-105.

90. The exhaustion requirement and the South Carolina authorities

are discussed in a prior Survey article, FOLK, Administrative Law, 13
S. C. L. Q. 31-34 (1960).
91. Id. at 33.
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B. Review of Facts

As usual, several workman's compensation decisions applied
the established South Carolina rule that findings of fact by the
Industrial Commission fail only if no "competent evidence"
sustains them.92 This standard is in practice identical with
the general rule of substantial evidence.9 3 It means, at least,
that an award cannot stand if "based on surmise, conjecture,
or speculation.19 4 Thus, the required evidentiary basis for
an award is not supplied merely by the presumption that one
was injured in his employment if he is "found injured where
his duty required him to be," 95 at least if there is no other
evidence to establish the fact.96 But the Commission alone
-nay resolve conflict or apparent conflict in expert testimony9 7
-or, more generally, "when there is a conflict in the evidence,
98
,either of different witnesses, or of the same witnesses.1
C. JurisdictionalFact
Two decisions again applied the settled local rule of independent judicial determination of those facts bearing upon
the jurisdiction of the Commission. 9 Indeed, the Court "has
the power and duty" to make its own conclusions from the
record, on the preponderance of the evidence, without regard
to the Commission's findings.10 0
D. Agency Discretion
in Bowen v. Chiquola Mfg. Co.,i 01 the Court clearly sus1ained the discretion of the Industrial Commission to make
-the definitive choice between at least two possible standards
,'of computing the appropriate compensation for a partially
'disabled employee. The Commission measured it by the dollar
92. Bowen v. Chiquola Mfg. Co., 238 S. C. 322, 120 S. E. 2d 99, 100,

:102 (1961); Packer v. Corbett Canning Co., 238 S. C. 431, 120 S. E. 2d
;398, 401 (1961).
93. FOLK, Administrative Law, 13 S. C. L. Q. 31 (1961).

94. Packer v. Corbett Canning Co., 238 S. C. 431, 435, 120 S. E. 2d

398, 400 (1961).
95. Id. at 436-437, 120 S. E. 2d at 400.

96. Owens v. Ocean Forest Club, 196 S. C. 97, 12 S. E. 2d 39 (1941).
97. McCarty v. Rendall Co., 238 S. C. 493, 501, 120 S. E. 2d 860, 864

(t1961).
98. Walsh v. United States Rubber Co., 238 S. C. 411, 416, 120 S.
E.
2d 685, 688 (1961).
99. Pyett v. Marsh Plywood Co., 240 S. C. 56, 124 S. E. 2d 617 (1962);
Brown v. Moorhead Co., 239 S. C. 604, 124 S.E. 2d 47 (1962).
100. Brown v. Moorhead Co., 239 S.C. 604, 606, 124 S. E. 2d 47, 48-49
(1962).
101. 238 S. C. 322, 120 S.B. 2d 99 (1961).
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difference of pre- and post-injury wages, but the lower court
insisted, as the "exclusive basis," upon a formula derived from
102
the percentage of disability disclosed by medical testimony.
The Supreme Court held that the Commission could use either
test, at least where there is evidence of both. The reference to
"evidence" is not helpful here, since the essential question is
whether the agency has discretion to choose between one or
another standard to be applied to the facts, or whether a
court can (as the Supreme Court ruled it could not) substitute
its judgment on this point of discretion. On the other hand,
in Pullman Co. v. Public Service Commission, 10 3 the Court
clearly substituted its own judgment on an issue seemingly
within the Commission's discretion, on the ground that evidence did not sustain the order in the case and that therefore
it would, under the judicial test, be "unjust, arbitrary and
unreasonable.'U0 4

102. Id. at 329, 120 S. E. 2d at l0i-102.
103. 238 S. C. 358, 120 S. E. 2d 214 (1961).

104. Id. at 362, 120 S. E. 2d at 216.
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